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Peter Margulies
If timidity in the face of government overreaching is the academy’s 
overarching historical narrative,1 responses to September 11 broke the mold. 
In what I will call the first generation of Guantánamo issues, members of 
the legal academy mounted a vigorous campaign against the unilateralism 
of Bush Administration policies.2 However, the landscape has changed in 
Guantánamo’s second generation, which started with the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Boumediene v. Bush,3 affirming detainees’ access to 
habeas corpus, and continued with the election of Barack Obama. Second 
generation Guantánamo issues are murkier, without the clarion calls that 
marked first generation fights. This Article identifies points of substantive and 
methodological convergence4 in the wake of Boumediene and President Obama’s 
election. It then addresses the risks in the latter form of convergence.
Substantive points of convergence that have emerged include a consensus 
on the lawfulness of detention of suspected terrorists subject to judicial review5 
and a more fragile meeting of the minds on the salutary role of constraints 
generally and international law in particular. However, the promise of 
1. See Sarah H. Ludington, The Dogs that Did Not Bark: The Silence of the Legal Academy 
During World War II, 60 J. Legal Educ. 396 (2010) (discussing the relative quiescence of 
legal scholars during the Japanese-American internment and other threats to civil liberties).
2. For a discussion of those policies, see Peter Margulies, Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in 
the Bush Administration (NYU Press 2010). An important early example of opposition 
to those policies is Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: 
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that President Bush lacked 
authority to unilaterally establish military commissions).
3. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
4. For a discussion of convergence in paradigms for the arrest, detention, and adjudication of 
suspected terrorists, see Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence 
of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1079 (2008).
5. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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substantive consensus is marred by the peril of a methodological convergence 
that I call dominant doctrinalism. Too often, law school pedagogy and 
scholarship squint through the lens of doctrine, inattentive to the way that 
law works in practice.6 Novel doctrinal developments, such as the president’s 
power to detain United States citizens or persons apprehended in the United 
States, get disproportionate attention in casebooks and scholarship. In 
contrast, developments such as an expansion in criminal and immigration 
law enforcement that build on settled doctrine get short shrift, even though 
they have equal or greater real-world consequences. Consumers of pedagogy 
and scholarship are ill-equipped to make informed assessments or push for 
necessary changes. If legal academia is to respond adequately to second 
generation Guantánamo issues, as well as issues raised by any future attacks, it 
must transcend the fascination with doctrine displayed by both left and right, 
and bolster its commitment to understanding and changing how law works 
“on the ground.”
To combat dominant doctrinalism and promote positive change, this 
Article asks for greater attention in three areas. First, law schools should do 
even more to promote clinical and other courses that give students first-hand 
experience in advocacy for vulnerable and sometimes unpopular clients, 
including the need for affirming their clients’ humanity and expanding the 
venue of advocacy into the court of public opinion.7 Clinical students also 
often discover with their clients that legal rights matter, although chastened 
veterans of rights battles like Joe Margulies and Hope Metcalf are correct that 
victories are provisional and sometimes pyrrhic.8 Second, legal scholarship 
and education should encourage the study of social phenomena like path-
dependence—the notion that past choices frame current advocacy strategies, 
so that lawyers recommending an option must consider the consequences of 
push-back from that choice. Aggressive Bush Administration lawyers unduly 
discounted risks flagged by more reflective colleagues on the consequences of 
push-back from the courts. Similarly, both the new Obama Administration and 
advocates trying to cope with Guantánamo’s post-Boumediene second generation 
failed to gauge the probability of push-back from the administration’s early 
announcement of plans to close the facility within a year. In each case, 
6. This is, of course, not a new critique; on the interaction of socio-political and legal 
developments from a Critical Legal Studies perspective, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical 
Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 103–14 (1984). Judges have weighed in as well; see Harry 
T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 
91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
7. On the importance of affirming a client’s humanity, see Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and 
Approval, 43 Hastings L.J. 991 (1992). For a discussion of mobilizing broader audiences in 
advocacy for corporate clients, see Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of 
Public Opinion, Installment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 1259 (2009).
8. See Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. Legal Educ. 433 (2010). 
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unexpected but reasonably foreseeable reactions skewed the implementation 
of legal and policy choices. Students should learn more about these dynamics 
before they enter the legal arena.
Third, teachers need to focus more on ways in which bureaucratic structures 
affect policy choices. For example, terrorism fears gave conservative politicians 
like John Ashcroft an opportunity to decimate asylum adjudication, harming 
many victims of persecution who have been unable to press meritorious 
claims for refugee status and other forms of relief. Similarly, creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security turned a vital governmental function 
like disaster relief into a bureaucratic orphan, thereby paving the way for the 
inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina. Students need more guidance on 
what to look for when structure shapes substance.
The Article is in three parts. Part I discusses substantive convergences on 
issues like detention and international law. Part II analyzes the problems posed 
by dominant doctrinalism, including the neglect of important criminal law 
issues in counterterrorism. Part III outlines suggestions that would temper 
doctrinalism’s impact by encouraging engagement with the realities of legal 
practice.
I. Substantive Convergence
While reports of an overarching consensus on counterterrorism law are 
premature, marked convergence has emerged, particularly as the Supreme 
Court declared off-limits the stark uses of presidential power that the Bush 
Administration deployed in the immediate aftermath of the September 
11 attacks. Convergence is evident on the specific issue of detention (with 
appropriate judicial review). Hints of a more provisional consensus have also 
emerged on the desirability of legal constraints on the president and the nature 
of international law. I consider each in turn.
A. Detention: Common Ground and a Residue of Disagreement
The academy started out solidly arrayed against the Bush Administration’s 
highhanded assertion of power to indefinitely detain suspected terrorists 
without judicial review.9 Some academics argued that such detention was 
categorically inappropriate.10 Others suggested that the administration’s flaws 
9. For a critique of the former administration’s position, see Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 
2, at 16–17. Scholarly supporters of the administration’s positions, some of whom worked for 
the administration at one time or another, included Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror 
in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 275 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (arguing 
that legal constraints on national security decisionmaking are usually counterproductive 
and institutionally flawed); John Yoo, War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the 
War on Terror (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006) (arguing for virtually unfettered presidential 
power).
10. See Margulies and Metcalf, supra note 8 (implicitly taking this position, although not 
defending it); see also Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of U.S. Practice Relating to “Enemy 
Combatants,” 10 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 232 (2009) (arguing that law of war prohibits 
most detention of individuals associated with Taliban or Al Qaeda).
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concerned the absence of judicial review, and the failure to consult Congress.11 
In significant ways, the Supreme Court settled much of the debate, requiring 
judicial review12 and congressional buy-in.13 After the Supreme Court’s 
decisions and the election of President Obama, a common-sense consensus 
has emerged.
Progressive scholars, including Georgetown’s David Cole, have 
acknowledged that the United States has authority to detain members of Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, subject to judicial review.14 Cole endorsed a narrower 
scope for the detention power than others suggest. However, the underlying 
basis for the power is accepted by a significant number of scholars across the 
spectrum. For progressives, this is in part a pragmatic calculation: Cole has 
argued that a categorical or absolutist argument against detention authority 
would “have the perverse effect of encouraging states to use lethal force, or to 
seek to act outside the law without even the safeguards that accompany wartime 
detention.”15 However, Cole has also endorsed detention as a necessary step 
for effective counterterrorism policy, acknowledging that barring detention 
11. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A 
Constitutional History, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (2008) (offering defense of heightened role 
for Congress and the courts); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil 
Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights 
During Wartime, in The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency 161 
(Duke Univ. Press Books 2005).
12. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (striking down restrictions on habeas corpus). 
For commentary on the case, see Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the 
New Common Law of Habeas, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 445 (2010) (analyzing the decision’s role in 
safeguarding the separation of powers); David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational 
Constitutionalism and Guantánamo Bay, 2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 47 (decision helps restore 
rule of law); Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 1165 (viewing 
habeas as check on political branches); Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional 
Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 661 (2009) (procedural 
rulings in terrorism cases guide interaction between the branches); but see Eric A. Posner, 
International Law and the War on Terror: Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 23, 39–46 (courts err in not extending greater 
deference to executive decisions about national security and foreign affairs).
13. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that president lacked authority to 
unilaterally establish military commissions that lacked safeguards required by Congress); cf. 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown’s Shadow, 53 St. Louis U. L. 
J. 29, 35–37 (2008) (discussing relationship between Hamdan and historical understanding 
of separation of powers).
14. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 
97 Cal. L. Rev. 693, 732–40 (2009). President Obama has also endorsed the detention subject 
to judicial review as one of three approaches to incapacitation and adjudication of cases 
involving suspected terrorists. See Remarks by President Barack Obama, Protecting Our 
Security and Our Values, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_
office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ (discussing relationship 
between criminal prosecution, military commissions, and detention under laws of war).
15. See Cole, supra note 14, at 695–96.
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and requiring the government to charge suspected terrorists in the criminal 
justice system would “inappropriately tie the United States’ hands.”16
As Cole suggests,17 if charge or release were the only choices and officials 
could not opt for detention, the high burden of proof in criminal cases would 
allow an Al Qaeda fighter to game the system and return to the fight. A 
soldier for one of the Axis powers during World War II was entitled to release 
only at the war’s conclusion or the advent of peace. However, an individual 
whom the government could show by clear and convincing evidence was an 
Al Qaeda fighter would be entitled to release, since the government could 
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed a crime. This 
asymmetry in results would give terrorists an incentive to recruit, while limiting 
counterterrorism strategies.
Empirical investigation supports Cole’s claim that wholesale release 
of detainees would pose security risks. Independent studies published in 
2008 revealed that a significant number of detainees boasted of their prior 
involvement with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.18 Court decisions since then have 
buttressed this point with specific facts about detainees’ ties.19
16. Id. at 727. For discussion of relevant legal standards, see Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp.2d 
63, 74–77 (D.D.C. 2009); cf. Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 
103 Am. J. Int’l L. 48, 70–71 (2009) (suggesting that in certain contexts detention of civilians 
linked with violent groups such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban complies with law of war, while 
specifying that compliance hinges on humane treatment).
17. See Cole, supra note 14, at 731–32.
18. See Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror 
84–92 (Penguin 2009) (noting that many detainees acknowledged working on behalf of 
Al Qaeda and the Taliban, including Walid Bin ‘Attash, who told an administrative 
tribunal that he had “purchas[ed] explosives” for the 1998 Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy 
bombings and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole); see also William Glaberson & Margot Williams, 
Next President Will Face Test on Detainees, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2008, at A1 (providing 
comprehensive survey of detainees).
19. See Fahad v. U.S., 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2010) (denying habeas petition, citing evidence 
that detainee had trained at a Taliban camp, obtained an AK-47 rifle, and participated in 
an extended march with armed men); Al-Adahi, et al. v. Obama, 698 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 10, 2010) (denying petition of Fami Salem Al-Assani, who trained at Al Qaeda’s main 
Afghanistan camp and accompanied Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora in December, 2001). 
For a balanced account of habeas litigation that criticizes the government for digging in 
its heels on some cases but also argues that decisions in higher courts will vindicate the 
government’s positions in many detainee matters, see Benjamin Wittes, Why I Don’t Like 
the “Scorecard,” Lawfare: Hard Nat’l Security Choices, Sept. 2010, available at http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2010/09/why-i-dont-like-the-scorecard/. While the present administration 
has approached detention cases more reasonably than Justice Department officials from the 
prior administration, questions linger over the moratorium on release of Yemeni detainees 
whom the government’s own task force has cleared for release. See Charlie Savage, Ruling 
Raises Doubts on Policy on Transfer Of Yemenis, N.Y. Times, July 9, 2010, at A11.
The Ivory Tower at Ground Zero
378	 Journal of Legal Education
Dismissing this convergence as backsliding or opacity does not do Cole 
justice. He has shown continued vigor in advocating for those wrongfully 
detained.20 However, Cole has also recognized that detention in particular 
cases, accompanied by judicial review, may be the only way to plug “unprotected 
spot[s] in the Nation’s armor.”21
This convergence is far from complete. Substantial disagreement exists 
on whether courts should develop detention standards through habeas 
proceedings22 or whether a statute is necessary to guide courts’ discretion.23 
20. See David Cole, What to Do About Guantánamo?, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 28, 2010, available 
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/what-do-about-Guantánamo/. 
Cole has also served as counsel for Maher Arar, who sought damages for his alleged 
extraordinary rendition to Syria, see Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (2010) (holding that national security and foreign affairs 
concerns required precluding damages action), and for the Humanitarian Law Project, 
which argued in the Supreme Court that a federal statute violated its First Amendment 
rights. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (upholding 
statute that bars providing material support such as funding or training to foreign terrorist 
organizations) [hereinafter HLP v. Holder]; see also infra, notes 39–48 and accompanying 
text (discussing material support laws). The author served as co-counsel on an amicus brief 
supporting the constitutionality of the statute challenged in HLP v. Holder, contingent 
on interpreting the statute to respect First Amendment rights. See Brief for Amicus Curiae 
Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related 
Issues, available at http://ccrjustice.org/holder-v-humanitarian-law-project (arguing that 
court should read statute as including exceptions for lawyers providing advice on compliance 
with federal law, journalists, scholars, and human rights groups).
21. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (citation omitted).
22. See Human Rights First & The Constitution Project, Habeas Works: Federal Courts’ 
Proven Capacity To Handle Guantánamo Cases (June 2010), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/Habeas-Works-final-web.pdf (arguing that courts are competent 
to develop workable standards); cf. Steve Vladeck, The Case Against the Graham Bill, 
Prawfsblawg, Sept. 2010, available at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/09/
the-case-against-the-graham-bill.html (arguing that statute would lead to undue rigidity 
and unfairness, and also encourage new detentions, including detention of United States 
persons on American soil).
23. See Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney & Rabea Benhalim, The Emerging Law of Detention: 
The Guantánamo Cases as Lawmaking, Governance Studies at Brookings, Jan. 22, 2010, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540601 (criticizing lack of uniformity in district court 
habeas decisions); Robert Chesney & Benjamin Wittes, Resolving Ambiguities? Yes. 
Dramatically Expanding Existing Detention Authority? No., Lawfare: Hard Nat’l Security 
Choices, Sept. 2010, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/resolving-ambiguities-
yes-dramatically-expanding-existing-detention-authority-no/#more-406 (defending bill 
introduced by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) to codify habeas determinations); Walter E. 
Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Reality, 
Seton Hall Leg. J. (forthcoming 2010), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1683636; 
cf. Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: Viewing 
the Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 245, 258–63 (2009) (analyzing 
possible standards).
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Scholars also disagree on the appropriate scope of the detention power.24 
However, these differences play out against a backdrop of consensus that some 
form of detention is both necessary and legitimate, as long as judicial review is 
available to uphold due process and sort out false positives.25
B. Convergence, Constraint, and Rights
The emerging consensus on detention, which may seem at first blush like 
a nod to the right, partners with a consensus that originated with the left—the 
need for constraints. Scholars with a progressive bent have pointed out that 
constraints on the executive’s detention authority have a first-order purpose: 
They limit the ability of the executive branch to manipulate factors like 
geography, which officials in the Bush Administration invested with talismanic 
significance when they established Guantánamo.26 However, constraints 
have a second-order purpose as well that often appeals to conservatives with 
a prudential bent. By signaling that government power is not unbounded, 
constraints encourage a wise executive to ration the ways in which she elects 
to push the envelope. Constrained in this manner, the executive’s pick of 
occasions for the exercise of power is more likely to trigger deference from 
other stakeholders, including the courts. In this vein, Jack Goldsmith has 
argued that the Bush Administration failed to obtain lasting approval for 
its policies because it viewed consultation as inconvenient or unnecessary.27 
For both liberals and nuanced conservatives, constraints are both necessary 
and desirable because they temper the pursuit of short-term goals with 
consideration of long-term values and interests.
24. Compare Cole, supra note 12 (arguing for limited scope focusing on Al Qaeda higher-ups and 
active fighters), with Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 23 (arguing for wider scope of 
detention authority).
25. Some commentators have also urged creation of a national security court. Compare Glenn 
Sulmasy, The National Security Court System: A Natural Evolution of Justice in an Age 
of Terror (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (recommending creation of national security court); 
Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and 
the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 87 (2008) 
(same); with Human Rights First & The Constitution Project, Habeas Works, supra note 
22 (arguing that federal courts’ strong performance with habeas cases obviates need for 
other forums); Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting 
Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts (Human Rights First 2008), available at http://www.
humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (concluding that federal courts 
can try suspected terrorists efficiently); Hearing of the Terrorism and Homeland Security 
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and 
Military Trials for Guantánamo and Beyond, Fed. News Service, July 28, 2009 (hereinafter 
Subcommittee Hearing) (remarks of Sen. Whitehouse, D-R.I.) (same).
26. See Azmy, supra note 12, at 467 (warning against executive manipulation of bright-line rules); 
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (protecting access to habeas corpus so 
that political branches could not “switch the Constitution on and off at will”).
27. Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 
206–07 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2007).
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C. Convergence and International Law
One constraint that has attracted a nascent if still provisional consensus 
is the role of international law. Pitched intellectual battles occurred on this 
ground in the early years of the Bush Administration. However, the couple of 
years have seen softening in positions on the left and right.
Before the Obama Administration, debates on international law usually 
entailed two polar opposite stances. One perspective, associated with Bush 
Administration officials, viewed particular sources of international law, 
such as customary international law, as being an illegitimate and incoherent 
source of rules. Jack Goldsmith and his co-author, Eric Posner, developed 
this view in a series of articles, and refined it for a 2005 book.28 Goldsmith 
also wrote disparagingly about the “human rights industry.”29 In contrast, 
pro-international law scholars extolled customary international law and 
international law. When a succession of bipartisan American administrations 
declined to give international law the precise effect it had elsewhere, seeking to 
adapt it to American contexts, critics often denounced this effort as American 
“exceptionalism”—a failure to live by rules that the rest of the world accepts.30 
In the Obama era, however, convergence has smoothed these jagged 
edges. Goldsmith still has severe doubts about CIL, but seems more open 
to the position that nations develop customary norms to further long-term 
interests in predictability and cooperation, even when those norms impair 
short-term interests.31 If this is true, customary international norms may serve 
a purpose akin to domestic constitutional constraints, curbing what Hamilton 
described as the impulsive “humors” of the people and their representatives.32 
By the same token, Harold Koh, who now serves as the legal adviser to the 
28. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2006); but see David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: 
Goldsmith and Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 333, 
364–70 (2006) (criticizing Goldsmith and Posner’s views as reductive).
29. See Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency, supra note 27, at 59. Goldsmith’s view on this point 
clashed with his view in the same book, that constraints can be healthy, disciplining the 
executive to pick her shots. Id. at 206–07. For analysis of Goldsmith’s complex views, see Peter 
Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, The Regulation of Lawyers, 
and the Separation of Powers, 68 Md. L. Rev. 1 (2008); cf. Stephen Holmes, The Spider’s 
Web: How Government Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the Law, in When Governments 
Break the Law: The Rule of Law and the Prosecution of the Bush Administration 121, 133–
35 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., NYU Press 2010) (citing Goldsmith’s skepticism 
about human rights advocacy, but not acknowledging countervailing praise of constraints 
in Goldsmith’s book).
30. Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 1480–95 (2003) 
(discussing positive and negative elements of American exceptionalism).
31. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1826–28, 1835 (2009) (discussing institutionalist 
version of international and constitutional law as coordinated games in which parties accept 
fewer short-term benefits to realize gains over time).
32. See The Federalist no.78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 470 (Clinton Rossiter ed., New American 
Library 1961).
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State Department, has articulated a more flexible view of international law, 
acknowledging that events such as 9/11 can lead to changes in norms such 
as the criteria for national self-defense. For example, they can justify actions 
such as drone attacks in Pakistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, as long as 
those strikes comport with basic guarantees such as avoiding disproportionate 
harm to civilians.33 One rationale for the drone strikes may be the difficulty 
of new detentions since law has come to Guantánamo. In sum, for abstract 
and instrumental reasons, subtle convergence may be carrying the day on the 
international law front.34
II. An Unwelcome Convergence: Dominant Doctrinalism
While the substantive convergence described above has been a welcome 
trend, the same cannot be said about the triumph of what I call dominant 
doctrinalism. Legal scholarship and pedagogy after September 11 focused on 
the doctrinal implications of the Bush Administration’s unilateral acts, rather 
than on other measures which affected just as many if not more individuals. 
Doctrinalism—a focus on legal doctrine to the exclusion of other factors such 
as social, economic, and political factors—has been a bane of law since the 
hey-day of formalism.35 To show its influence in the post-9/11 climate, I first 
33. See Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Dept. of State, The Obama Administration and International 
Law, Annual Meeting of the Am. Soc’y of Int’l L., March 25, 2010, available at http://www.
state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
34. Debate has also narrowed on the question of accountability for Bush Administration policies, 
including coercive interrogation. The Justice Department decided not to seek professional 
discipline of lawyers who drafted opinions authorizing such tactics. See David Margolis, 
Assoc. Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections 
to the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s 
Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues 
Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” 
on Suspected Terrorists, Jan. 5, 2010, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf. Some scholars disagree with the Justice Department’s 
justification for declining to seek sanctions. See David Cole, They Did Authorize 
Torture, But…, N.Y. Rev. Bks, Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/
nyrblog/2010/mar/10/they-did-authorize-torture-but/ (arguing that DOJ Final Report did 
not adequately address flaws in lawyers’ opinions); David Luban, David Margolis is Wrong: 
The Justice Department’s ethics investigation shouldn’t leave John Yoo and Jay Bybee 
home free, Slate, Feb. 22, 2010, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2245531/ (same). Others 
viewed the decision as appropriate, while agreeing that the lawyers’ advice was myopic, at 
best. See Peter Margulies, Changing of the Guard: The Obama Administration, National 
Security, and the Ethics of Legal Transitions (unpublished manuscript), draft available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673989. However, few if any members of the legal academy 
argued for resumption of these coercive measures.
35. Decades ago, the legal realists discussed the normative and descriptive challenges with a 
formalist approach to legal doctrine. See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand. 
L. Rev. 395 (1950) (arguing that equally respected canons of statutory interpretation often 
led to opposite results). For an argument that some supposedly formalist judges actually 
considered policy, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role 
of Politics in Judging 67–90 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009).
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consider the post-9/11 neglect of criminal laws governing terrorism. I then 
briefly examine the quality of attention paid to issuance of National Security 
Letters (NSLs), compared to the scholarly attention devoted to the Bush 
Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).
A. Pedagogy Neglected: The Strange Case of the Material Support Statutes
The legal academy has largely failed to address the scope and operation 
of criminal statutes regarding terrorism, including a matched pair of federal 
statutes that bar “material support” of terrorist activity36 and designated 
foreign terrorist organizations.37 The government has prosecuted scores of 
defendants—the vast majority of them Muslim and/or Arab—under these 
statutes, while seeking to detain only three United States persons.38 However, 
this development has received only modest scholarly attention.
The government has used § 2339B, which prohibits material support 
specifically intended to facilitate terrorist activity, in many of these cases. 
Prosecutions often rely on informants who act as entrepreneurs serving a 
personal agenda. In exchange for substantial cash rewards or consideration 
regarding their own legal difficulties, informants promise prosecutors that they 
will deliver a package of defendants.39 In a number of cases, informants have 
had to coax and cajole their targets, who seemed distracted by ordinary matters 
like exercise and jobs.40 Some of these cases had to be brought despite doubts 
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2010).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010).
38. This group includes Ali Saleh al-Marri, a foreign national arrested in the United States, 
with whom the Obama Administration’s Justice Department, under Attorney General 
Eric Holder, concluded a plea agreement in 2009. See John Schwartz, Path to Justice, 
but Bumpy, for Terrorists, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2009, at A9. It also includes United States 
citizen Jose Padilla, who was arrested in Chicago, and eventually convicted of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B after being held as an enemy combatant for over three-and-a-half years. 
See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 112–13. The third detainee was Yaser Esam 
Hamdi, a presumptive United States citizen who had lived most of his life abroad. Hamdi 
was captured in Afghanistan, and released in 2004 after the Supreme Court held that that 
the government needed to comply with due process for his continued detention. See Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-
American It Had Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y Times, Oct. 11, 2004, at A15.
39. Cf. U.S. v. Hayat, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 40157 (E.D. Ca. May 17, 2007) (denying motion for 
a new trial; quoting juror who was convinced after long deliberations that defendant had 
provided material support to terrorism and lied to federal agents, but who acknowledged that 
“future cases” brought under the counterterrorism statutes could result in sending people 
to prison “who never committed the crime”). The case involved an informant who made 
persistent approaches to Hayat to travel to Afghanistan, and a confession obtained after 
fifteen hours of interrogation. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory 
Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 425, 488–89 
(2007).
40. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 106 (discussing the case of Bronx bassist Tarik 
Shah, who eventually pleaded guilty to a violation of § 2339B); see also id. at 117 (discussing 
Miami “Seas of David” case, in which an informant working with the government and 
promising free merchandise persuaded a religious sect of Haitian Americans to turn away 
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about their provenance, particularly where targets had special knowledge of 
a particular area, as in the JFK bombing plot, or had previously engaged in 
illegal conduct, such as the Fort Dix conspiracy defendants.41 However, in 
other cases, the time-honored fuzziness of conspiracy law allowed prosecutors 
to charge defendants catalyzed by an informant with crimes based on proof of 
an agreement to engage in illegal activity, and little more.
While there is a rich literature on prosecutorial decisionmaking42 and on 
informants,43 few writers have focused on the decisions made by prosecutors 
in terrorism cases.44 Most other scholarship, and, I fear, teaching has been 
sketchy. Few articles discuss in depth the interaction of detention of alleged 
terrorists and criminal liability.45 The disjuncture stems in part from the 
awkward fit between this aspect of criminal law and established doctrinal fields 
from internecine squabbling just long enough to collect data on South Florida and Chicago 
landmarks, including the Sears Tower). I do not suggest that prosecutors should stop using 
such statutes, which often provide the only way to ferret out certain types of dangerous 
conduct. However, scholars should engage further with the difficult trade-offs such cases 
present. For example, in a recent case involving a conspiracy to place bombs at Bronx 
synagogues, a government informant strongly suggested that the defendants would receive 
substantial amounts of cash if they followed through on the plot, and that the informant’s 
life would be in danger if the defendants refused. See Kareem Fahim, Informer in Synagogue 
Plot Is Accused of Bullying Suspect, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2010, at A20. While the judge 
expressed doubts about portions of the informant’s testimony incriminating the defendants, 
the defendants did not dispute that they were arrested after planting devices outside the 
temples which they believed to be explosives (the devices, supplied by the informant, were 
actually fake). Id. The defendants’ entrapment defense ultimately failed to persuade the jury. 
See Kareem Fahim, 4 Convicted of Attempting to Blow Up 2 Synagogues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
19, 2010, at A21.
41. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 122.
42. See, e.g., Fred Z. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A 
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2010) (discussing 
content and implementation of rules to encourage prosecutors to prevent wrongful 
convictions).
43. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling 
and Embellishment, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 917 (1999) (noting incentives for dishonesty among 
cooperators); but see Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and 
Atonement, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 33–42 (2003) (arguing that cooperation can spur atonement, 
instead of merely reflecting utilitarian calculus); cf. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 
56 Ohio St. L.J. 69 (1995) (discussing cooperation and legal ethics).
44. For an insightful exception that discusses the discretion the statute gives to prosecutors, see 
Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy, supra note 39. Ironically, since Chesney supports statutory 
codification of habeas standards, see Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 23, Margulies 
and Metcalf would view him as a conservative. This litmus test illustrates doctrinalism’s 
creeping influence, even among those who purport to reject it.
45. In addition to Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy, supra note 39, see Norman Abrams, Anti-
Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement (2d ed., West 2005); Stephen Dycus, et al., National 
Security Law 817–38 (4th ed., Aspen Pub. 2007); Benjamin J. Priester, Who is a “Terrorist”? 
Drawing the Line Between Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 
1255 (2008); Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military 
Detention, 2006 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1255.
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within legal education. Criminal counterterrorism statutes are important to 
national security law, but less central than issues of separation of powers, the 
use of force, and detention.46 They have less salience in constitutional law than 
executive power, federalism, due process, and equal protection.47 Similarly, 
they are less foundational to criminal law than bedrock issues of criminal 
responsibility.48 This is not a knock on casebook authors, who face difficult 
choices on what to cover. Nevertheless, legal education’s focus on doctrine 
shapes those choices in particular ways, which do not always match law’s real-
world consequences.49
B. Disproportionate Doctrinalism and the Case of the Missing National Security Letters
Another measure of disproportionate doctrinalism has been the vast attention 
paid to the Bush Administration’s program of warrantless surveillance,50 as 
46. Even in a national security law casebook, other topics receive substantially more attention. 
See Dycus, et al., supra note 45, at 703–58 (detention); 876–906 (military commissions).
47. See Paul Brest, et. al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 841–
81 (5th ed., Aspen Pub. 2006) (discussing executive power and detention). Issues relating to 
the material support statutes receive little coverage in this otherwise excellent casebook.
48. See Sanford Kadish, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Carol Steiker, Criminal Law and Its Processes: 
Cases and Materials 602–03 (8th ed., Aspen Pub. 2007) (discussing material support 
statutes).
49. The issue of interrogation techniques has filtered through the law school curriculum. A 
casebook on professional responsibility has included useful materials regarding legal advice 
authorizing coercive interrogation of terror suspects. See Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, 
Ethical Problems in the Practice of Law 302–04 (2d ed., Aspen Pub. 2008) (discussing 
problem developed by Professor Kathleen Clark of Washington University); cf. Kadish, 
Schulhofer & Steiker, supra note 48, at 814–21 (discussing defense of necessity in cases 
involving coercive questioning). Legal ethics scholars have analyzed these issues in depth. 
See David Luban, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, 
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law 162, 176–80, 200–02 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2007); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. Nat’l 
Sec. L. & Pol’y 455 (2005); Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: A Debate, in The Torture Debate 
in America 236, 237–38 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); Margulies, 
True Believers at Law, supra note 29; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of 
Law and Morals, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67, 80–85 (2005); cf. Norman W. Spaulding, Professional 
Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1931, 1975–76 (2008) 
(arguing that flaws in legal advice emerged from ideology, not from kowtowing to client’s 
wishes). Casebooks in constitutional law may devote more space to §2339B after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), 
holding that Congress could impose what the majority termed content-based restrictions 
on speech, such as training in non-violence, performed under the direction and control 
of a foreign terrorist organization such as Hamas. However, this increased attention only 
confirms the sway of dominant doctrinalism, since the plaintiffs in this case mounted an 
as-applied challenge based on their alleged fear that prosecutors would target them if they 
engaged in this activity. No actual prosecution had ever taken place.
50. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 17–19; Eric Lichtblau, Bush’s Law: The 
Remaking of American Justice 154–55 (Pantheon Books 2008); Charlie Savage, Takeover: 
The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy 115–18 
(Little, Brown and Co. 2007).
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compared with the use of National Security Letters (NSLs) and other forms of 
statutorily authorized administrative requests for information.51 The Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (TSP) was more significant doctrinally, because the 
Bush Administration acted without statutory authorization.52 However, there 
is a strong argument that NSLs led to the retention of more private data by 
federal authorities.53 The use of NSLs also led to bad habits in law enforcement 
which will be difficult to break. For example, officials sometimes used 
“blanket” NSLs that covered a wide spectrum of information requests not tied 
to a specific investigation.54 The Justice Department’s own inspector general 
rightly condemned this practice.55 In addition, the FBI failed to document 
its use of NSLs both internally and in reports to Congress.56 Moreover, until 
recently, the law required a recipient of an NSL to keep the contents of the 
letter confidential, even from the recipient’s lawyer.57 Recently, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, after holding the statute unconstitutional because 
it placed the burden on the recipient of the letter to contest the confidentiality 
provisions, fashioned a novel remedy that facilitated such challenges.58 
However, few commentators have addressed the use of NSLs, despite their 
intrusiveness, perhaps because Congress provided for them, and discovering 
abuses requires a more careful look at law “on the ground,” not just legal 
doctrine.59
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1), (2) (2010). In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress broadened 
the statutory authorization for National Security Letters (NSLs) to allow the FBI to 
seek information “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” Id. Prior to September 11, the statute had 
required “specific and articulable facts giving reasons to believe that the person or entity to 
whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” 
See United States Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s Use of National Security Letters, March 2007, at 23 (hereinafter 
OIG NSL Report), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf.
52. The TSP evaded the constraints Congress had enacted as part of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA). See 50 U.S.C. § 1801–45 (2010). See Edward T. Swaine, The Political 
Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 263, 316–24 (2010).
53. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 20.
54. Id. at 21.
55. See OIG NSL Report, supra note 51, at 72–90.
56. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 170 n.87.
57. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 575, 643–44 (2010).
58. See Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).
59. For selected exceptions, see Dycus, et al., supra note 45, at 557–81; see also Orin Kerr, 
Updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225, 232 (2008) 
(mentioning Congress’ enactment of authority for NSLs); Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving 
Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 287, 301–02 (2008) (comparing 
NSLs with FISA regime).
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III. Challenging Doctrinalism’s Empire
Legal educators should strive to break doctrinalism’s grip. The task will not 
be easy, because so much of legal education still turns on coverage of doctrinal 
issues. Indeed, discarding doctrine would be as ill-advised as it is unavailing. 
The task is to supplement and inform doctrinal teaching on law and terrorism, 
which I suggest with three steps: 1) enhance clinical education opportunities 
for representing the despised and unpopular, 2) promote understanding of 
social phenomena, such as path-dependence, that affect lawyering, and, 3) 
teach how the structure of legal institutions affects outcomes.
A. Clinical Education and the Virtues of Vigorous Advocacy for Pariahs
To combat doctrinalism, law schools should enhance experiential learning 
on the interaction of law and terrorism. Clinics, simulations, and skills 
courses that focus on issues of law and terrorism can deepen the learning that 
doctrinalism often obscures. Students in clinics that represented detainees 
learned about the challenges of lawyering for the unpopular and despised, the 
affective as well as instrumental needs of clients,60 and the eclectic advocacy 
strategies necessary for competently representing this group.61 Clinics also 
taught students the power of rights, although as Margulies and Metcalf 
note, that power is always provisional and frequently fleeting. At their best, 
clinics taught students to be resourceful, reaching out to new forums and 
audiences, and to tolerate and embrace the ambiguity of legal representation 
in cross-cultural settings.62 In some cases, as I’ll discuss in the next subsection, 
clinicians and other lawyers became over-invested in their own narratives, 
and failed to anticipate that narratives that worked in one context, such as 
Guantánamo’s first generation, would be less useful down the road. However, 
because of their focus on the concrete dynamics of cases, clinics are an ideal 
site for brainstorming about these dilemmas of legal practice.
60. See Robert Dinerstein, Stephen Ellman, Isabelle Gunning & Ann Shalleck, Connection, 
Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 
Clinical L. Rev. 755, 758–66 (2004).
61. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 
103 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1683 (2009); Mark Denbeaux & Christina Boyd-Nafstad, The Attorney-
Client Relationship in Guantánamo Bay, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 491 (2007); Jonathan Hafetz, 
Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at Guantánamo, 5 
Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 127 (2006); Martha Rayner, Roadblocks to Effective 
Representation of Uncharged, Indefinitely Imprisoned Clients at Guantánamo Bay Military 
Base, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 485 (2007); cf. Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of 
Public Interest Law, 57 Duke L.J. 891 (2008) (discussing innovations in practice by public 
interest lawyers across the globe).
62. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 
54 UCLA L. Rev. 999 (2007) (discussing lawyering issues arising because of differences of 
language and culture with clients); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural 
Competence in Lawyers, 8 Clinical L. Rev. 33, 33 (2001).
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Clinics tell students that rights matter. As critical feminist and race theorists 
have observed,63 rights can be a part of a discourse that empowers. They are 
not a panacea, as critics of the legal profession’s performance over the past 
nine years have noted.64 However, just as legal advocacy during the civil rights 
movement chipped out a foothold for further mobilization efforts, rights since 
9/11 raise consciousness and redefine the contours of what is possible.65 For 
example, when lawyers began seeing scores of Guantánamo detainees in 2004, 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush, independent accounts 
reflect that the treatment of the detainees improved. This improvement did 
not resolve all problems, by any means; non-dangerous detainees still lacked 
a clear pathway to release, and confinement was still rigorous. However, the 
government stopped using the harshest interrogation techniques.66 The causes 
were complex, including pushback from more scrupulous lawyers within the 
administration,67 but the presence of lawyers at Guantánamo was clearly one 
factor. The government knew that detainee lawyers would report ongoing 
abuses, and it took steps to give the lawyers less to talk about.
63. See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: 
Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986); cf. Richard 
Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 
22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 301 (1987) (analyzing flaws and benefits of critical legal studies 
agenda which discounted value of rights).
64. See Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 8; compare Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in 
the “War on Terror,” 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1013 (2008) (asserting that emphasis on procedural 
rights of detainees has frequently neglected substantive questions), with Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65 (2006) 
(arguing for virtues of advocacy approach that cast government as challenging established 
procedures).
65. For an insightful account that avoids reifying rights but nonetheless recognizes their power 
in certain situations, see Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo, supra note 61, at 1712–13. 
66. See Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Executive Summary, Inquiry 
into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., Nov. 2008, at xxv. 
Reporters have documented the use of waterboarding in 2003. See Scott Shane, Interrogations’ 
Effectiveness May Prove Elusive, N.Y. Times, April 23, 2009, at A14 (discussing March, 2003 
waterboarding of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, 
documented in Justice Department memoranda). However, reporters have been unable to 
document use of waterboarding in 2004 or subsequent years, after officials from the Justice 
Department and the CIA Inspector General’s office began to raise questions. Id.
67. See Goldsmith, Terror Presidency, supra note 27, at 142–54 (discussing successful effort to 
withdraw two legal opinions that provided legal support for “enhanced” interrogation 
techniques); Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror 
Turned Into a War on American Ideals 316–18 (Doubleday 2008) (describing efforts during 
President Bush’s second term of officials serving under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
such as Legal Adviser John Bellinger, Matthew Waxman, and Philip Zelikow); Testimony of 
Philip Zelikow, Hearing of the Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Chaired by Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Fed. News 
Service, May 13, 2009 (same).
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Similarly, rights move the baselines of possible outcomes. Before Rasul and 
Boumediene, the big question for detainees who did not pose a danger was if 
they would be released. After these cases, the question for detainees held not 
to be part of Al Qaeda68 was when release would come. There is a big difference 
between these two questions. The latter makes it far easier to obtain leverage 
against the government. Moreover, lawyers have “voted with their feet” on 
these issues—lawyers seek to bring habeas petitions for detainees at other sites, 
such as Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan,69 precisely because those lawyers 
know that rights do bring increased leverage for their clients. The government 
seems to believe this too—that is why the Bush Administration fought tooth 
and nail against rights for detainees, and why the Obama Administration is 
now contesting the habeas rights of detainees at Bagram. Indeed, although 
Joe Margulies now criticizes a focus on rights in his co-authored article for 
this symposium, a few years ago he confessed that “few moments in [his] legal 
career have been as gratifying” as the reunion he witnessed between a just-
released Guantánamo client and the client’s wife.70
As this moving moment reveals, clinics can also teach lawyers that 
competent representation includes what I’ve called “affective solidarity.”71 
Lawyers do not merely promote the legal interests of their clients; they also 
help provide the emotional support that clients in difficult situations need. 
Clients who are isolated and despised like the Guantánamo detainees need 
this human support more than most.72 Sometimes this support shows itself 
through simple human acts that a lawyer is uniquely situated to perform 
for the client in detention: For example, lawyers representing Guantánamo 
detainees in habeas or military commission proceedings were permitted to 
bring their clients food. Baher Azmy, a Seton Hall law professor and attorney 
for a wrongly accused client, Murat Kurnaz, recounted that he bonded with 
his client after bringing him McDonald’s coffee with six packets of sugar, 
which Azmy later supplemented with “baklava, cheese, pita bread, Turkish 
68. Courts applying the law of war have held that being part of Al Qaeda entails giving or 
receiving “orders or directions” within the group. See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 424 
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
69. See Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that habeas jurisdiction did not 
extend to Bagram).
70. See Joseph Margulies, Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power 2 (Simon & 
Schuster 2006).
71. See Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers 
for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 Md. L. Rev. 173, 179–81 (2003).
72. With a client such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, attending to this human element is 
more challenging. See William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal 
Formalism, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 487 (1980) (discussing limits on teaching of empathy as 
virtue in legal representation). Yet, we praise lawyers who can marshal empathy, even—or 
perhaps especially—when their clients’ conduct seemingly makes this impossible. See Jessica 
Silbey, Truth Tales and Trial Films, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 551, 578 n.102 (2007) (discussing 
film account of Clarence Darrow’s plea for the lives of his clients, the convicted murderers 
Leopold and Loeb).
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figs, fresh garlic…subs, pizza, Filet-O-Fish,” and a veritable smorgasbord of 
other culinary items.73 Sharing food with a detainee client was an affirmation 
of the precious rhythms of life’s routine, which a facility like Guantánamo 
disrupted.74 This form of affective solidarity had an instrumental component 
as well; it helped build rapport and facilitate discussion of facts relevant to the 
representation.75
In helping students explore the intangible realm of affective interactions, 
clinical courses add a dimension that doctrine neglects. Doctrinal courses will 
help a lawyer understand legal arguments, but getting to the legal arguments 
is impossible unless the client is willing to actually speak with the lawyer. 
A client who lacks trust in the lawyer will not pursue a legal challenge, and 
therefore cannot keep the government honest in the way that the Constitution 
envisions. Clinical courses bring home this reality, and give the lawyer a 
repertoire of techniques for gaining client trust.
Clinicians know that rights also galvanize mobilization in other spheres, 
which I have called crossover advocacy.76 For example, when Maher Arar 
filed a lawsuit challenging his extraordinary rendition to Syria, where he was 
tortured for the better part of a year, he was also able to obtain a congressional 
hearing looking into his case. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, not one 
given to casual displays of regret, acknowledged that the government had 
handled Arar’s case poorly.77 This reckoning, however partial, documented 
the practice of extraordinary renditions,78 and helped persuade the Obama 
Administration to stop the practice.
By instilling this affective component and commitment to crossover 
advocacy, clinical education nurtures lawyers who can challenge future patterns 
of government overreaching. Consider a law student like Sarah H. Lorr, who 
73. See Jonathan Hafetz & Mark P. Denbeaux, The Guantánamo Lawyers 58 (NYU Press 2009).
74. See Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo, supra note 61.
75. Guantánamo Lawyers, supra note 73, at 63–64 (recollection of habeas lawyer Joshua 
Colangelo-Bryan).
76. See Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies 
in the War on Terror, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 347, 423–29 (2009); The Guantánamo Lawyers, 
supra note 73, at 308–09 (discussing advocacy efforts at Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights by American University law professor Rick Wilson); cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, 
Post-Racialism in the Inner City: Structure and Culture in Lawyering, 98 Geo. L.J. 921, 
957–66 (2010) (discussing use of rights as element in community organizing, education, 
and advocacy); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 
Calif. L. Rev. 1879, 1905–06 (2007) (discussing role of lawyers in organizing subordinated 
communities).
77. See Scott Shane, On Torture, 2 Messages and a High Political Cost, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 
2007, at A18.
78. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the 
Rule of Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1333 (2007); cf. Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in 
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, Iowa L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Judging Myopia], draft available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1564411 (analyzing actions for damages involving extraordinary renditions).
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visited Guantánamo while in Fordham’s International Justice Clinic. Lorr, 
who had to cross to the other side of a barbed-wire fence to interview a client 
spending his fifth year in confinement without judicial review, will likely view 
the government’s future claims with a robust skepticism born of experience.79 
Like the perspectives that veteran death penalty lawyers such as Joe Margulies 
and Clive Stafford-Smith brought to their Guantánamo representation, 
clinical experience prods lawyers to question authority even in extraordinary 
times, when conventional wisdom initially counsels deference.80
Although some have attacked the patriotism of lawyers for detainees,81 
those critics fundamentally misunderstand the role that lawyers play in a 
constitutional republic. From de Toqueville’s time, American lawyers have 
been intermediaries who temper the excesses of both the private sector and 
government.82 As we shall see in the next subsection, unchecked excesses 
promote volatility in governance, leading to the “pendular swings” that Justice 
Kennedy cautioned against in his opinion for the Court in Boumediene v. Bush,83 
which struck down the Military Commission Act of 2006’s limits on habeas. 
Lawyers who challenge the government promote greater stability in the polity, 
by deterring the myopia that could otherwise afflict powerful decisionmakers. 
In this fashion, lawyers safeguard the deliberative virtues necessary for 
democracy. Teachers who have advocated for detainees model this democratic 
understanding of the lawyer’s role.
B. The Advocate’s Peril: Path-Dependence as Social Phenomenon
While the Guantánamo lawyers served constitutional values by bringing 
judicial review to Guantánamo, their efforts floundered through a failure to 
understand social phenomena that influence law’s implementation, including 
path-dependence.84 Ironically, Bush Administration officials who had authored 
the unilateral policies the Guantánamo lawyers challenged made the same 
mistake. Neither appreciated that since where we were influences where we are 
79. See Guantánamo Lawyers, supra note 73, at 68–70 (discussing trip to Guantánamo with 
Professor Martha Rayner).
80. Id. at 25–26 (observations by Hofstra Law School habeas expert Eric M. Freedman regarding 
death penalty lawyers’ early, formative role in Guantánamo representation).
81. See John Schwartz, Attacks on Detainee Lawyers Split Conservatives, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
10, 2010, at A1 (noting attacks by Liz Cheney, daughter of the former vice president, on 
Obama Administration officials who had earlier represented Guantánamo detainees, as well 
as defense of those officials by noted conservatives like Kenneth Starr, who had served as 
independent counsel investigating President Clinton).
82. See Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer in American Democracy, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 
1611, 1620–21 (2009).
83. 533 U.S. at 742.
84. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason 108–110 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) 
(discussing path-dependence in common law adjudication); Oona A. Hathaway, Path 
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law 
System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 606–22 (2001) (same).
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going, the consequences of an earlier choice may permanently alter subsequent 
options. For legal education to break decisively from doctrinalism, a thorough 
understanding of theoretical constructs like path-dependence should inform 
pedagogical practice.
To understand path-dependence, consider the following hypothetical. 
Suppose an official can consult with stakeholders at Time 1, or delay 
consultation until Time 2. Consultation at Time 1 could solidify stakeholders’ 
allegiance. Conversely, a failure to consult could solidify mistrust. Moreover, 
the failure to consult yields opportunity costs. The level of consultation that 
could have engendered agreement at Time 1 will not satisfy stakeholders at 
Time 2. Securing consent becomes that much more expensive, requiring even 
greater official concessions.
The Bush Administration learned this lesson the hard way. Its early 
intransigence alienated the courts, convincing them that more accountability 
was necessary. More timely concessions by the administration might have 
triggered greater judicial deference.85
Unfortunately, advocates for Guantánamo detainees who celebrated the 
election of President Obama did not appreciate that consultation is important 
not only for ramping up aggressive policies, but also for winding down those 
measures. Advocates pushed for President Obama’s early announcement 
that he would close Guantánamo by January 20, 2010.86 Troubled by the 
administration’s failure to consult, Congress enacted legislation that impeded 
closure efforts.87 While within a few months President Obama articulated a 
85. See Goldsmith, Terror Presidency, supra note 27, at 139 (arguing that if Bush Administration 
had complied with rudimentary Geneva Convention requirements in the twenty months 
after September 11, it would have “avoided the more burdensome procedural…requirements 
that became practically necessary under the pressure of subsequent judicial review”).
86. See § 2(b), Executive Order, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at 
the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Jan. 22, 2009 
[hereinafter Executive Order], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
closureofGuantánamodetentionfacilities/; cf. Peter Margulies, Putting Guantánamo in the 
Rear-View Mirror: The Political Economy of Detention Policy, 32 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 339, 
354 (2010); Ken Gude, Getting Back on Track to Close Guantánamo 3 (Center for American 
Progress Nov. 2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/11/gitmo_
on_track.html (discussing presidential announcement and aftermath); Sarah Mendelson, 
The Guantánamo Countdown, Foreign Pol’y, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/01/the_Guantánamo_countdown?page=0,1&%24Versi
on=0&%24Path=/&%24Domain=.foreignpolicy.com,%20%24Version%3D0 (same).
87. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–32, H.R. 2346, § 14104(a) (2009) 
(“None of the funds made available in this or any prior Act may be used to release an 
individual who is detained as of the date of enactment of this Act, at Naval Station, 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, into the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or the District 
of Columbia”).
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fuller strategy that may yet produce agreement,88 the haste of the original 
closure announcement spawned mistrust. As of December, 2010, Guantánamo 
is still here, with no augurs of its demise any time soon.89
Path-dependence also reveals that detainee advocates were victims of 
their own success. The story of Guantánamo currently stretches over two 
generations: pre- and post-Boumediene. Before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Boumediene, which upheld detainees’ access to habeas corpus, establishing 
a definitive right to judicial review was central to the advocates’ task. In the 
second, post-Boumediene generation, attention shifted to securing the release 
of advocates’ individual clients. To make the case for judicial review, detainee 
advocates deployed what I have elsewhere called the “misadventure thesis”—
the claim that all detainees were in the wrong place at the wrong time.90 This 
narrative helped prompt the courts to establish a framework for judicial 
review.91 However, this overarching narrative has not ensured that those rights 
would result in release in particular cases.
The first-generation narrative has undermined detainee advocates’ second-
generation agenda because some (although not all) of the remaining 170 
detainees have ties to the Taliban or Al Qaeda that make the misadventure 
thesis inappropriate.92 Advocates have discovered that rights facilitate 
consideration of the merits of cases, but do not guarantee favorable results. 
Indeed, the discontinuity between the misadventure thesis and the messier 
facts of individual cases may have actually produced greater judicial skepticism 
than would otherwise have been the case.93 Appreciating the effects of path-
dependence would have encouraged habeas lawyers to frame a more nuanced 
thesis in first-generation Guantánamo efforts, to reduce the skepticism they 
have sometimes encountered in second-generation litigation.94
88. See Obama, Protecting Our Security, supra note 14.
89. See Charlie Savage, Closing Guantánamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2010, at 
A13.
90. See Margulies, Advocacy Strategies, supra note 76, at 403–05.
91. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (requiring due process safeguards for 
detention of presumptive American citizens in part to reduce incidence of false positives, 
such as detention of an “errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker”).
92. See Wittes, The Long War, supra note 18, at 74–90; Glaberson & Williams, supra note 18.
93. This is hard to measure. However, the court in at least one detainee case expressed skepticism 
when advocates advanced a position that clashed with earlier arguments. See Hamdan 
v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2008) (declining to enjoin pending military 
commission proceeding authorized by Congress, in case where advocates had argued that 
earlier military commission was flawed because it lacked statutory authorization).
94. The overselling of narratives is a persistent risk in many advocacy arenas. Some have pivoted 
to protect against this danger. For example, informed opponents of capital punishment 
concede that lists of “‘the exonerated’ include defendants who were not wholly blameless.” 
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction 
and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 
95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 587, 597–98 (2005). With a better understanding of path-
dependence, lawyers can reduce backlash and other unintended consequences, and more 
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C. The Significance of Structure in Government Responses to Terror
The academy also needs to pay closer attention to the role of government 
structure in counterterrorism measures. Structure can dictate substance, or at 
least exert a powerful influence. However, those outcomes remain invisible or 
unexplained if the student does not know where to look.
Consider here the assertion by Margulies and Metcalf that the government’s 
poor response to Hurricane Katrina was unrelated to counterterrorism 
policy.95 A more probing look at bureaucratic structures suggests a significant, 
albeit oblique, link between the government’s response to Katrina and the 
war on terror.96 The politics of the war on terror underwrote creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from a patchwork quilt of 
agencies with radically disparate missions, including the former Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, the Coast Guard, and the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration (FEMA). Predictably, activities related to 
national security received a healthy helping of the budgetary pie, while 
officials siphoned off resources from other vital missions, such as emergency 
response to natural disasters.97 Senior bureaucracy at DHS focused on terror, 
and lacked background in emergency response. Without an appreciation for 
the importance of this mission, critical jobs went to unqualified patronage 
hires, like Michael Brown, who assumed leadership of FEMA even though his 
most useful experience with natural disasters had been heading the Arabian 
Horses Association.98 These structural features foretold the cascade of errors 
in the government’s Katrina response.
Structural concerns have also contributed to other policy glitches. 
For example, the war on terror provided an opening for former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft’s evisceration of immigration adjudication.99 Today, 
a structural mismatch between adjudication and enforcement resources 
continues to plague immigration law. Enforcement resources have grown, as 
the apprehension, detention, and removal of undocumented aliens and other 
non-citizens became a growth industry. However, adjudication, like emergency 
effectively ensure the flourishing of innovation. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015 (2004) 
(describing public law remedies that promote innovation); but see Scott L. Cummings & 
Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1235, 1317–27 (2010) 
(arguing that backlash has not been significant consequence of same-sex equality litigation).
95. See Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 8, at 439.
96. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 21–23.
97. See Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar & Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: 
Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 725–26 
(2006).
98. See Juliette Kayyem, Appointments that Disappoint, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 2005, at B11.
99. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 30–33; Linda Kelly Hill, Holding the Due 
Process Line for Asylum, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 85 (2007); Shruti Rana, “Streamlining” the Rule 
of Law: How the Department of Justice is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829 (2009).
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management, remained a bureaucratic orphan in the Justice Department, 
chronically starved of resources and capacity. The result was a burgeoning 
immigration backlog100 that thwarted accurate adjudication.101
Similarly, opportunity costs have burgeoned through the takeover of criminal 
prosecution by immigration imperatives.102 Prosecutions of non-citizens for 
illegal re-entry into the country and other minor offenses, like individual 
cases of immigration fraud, now account for a substantial percentage of all 
federal prosecutions.103 Federal prosecutors who must pursue these cases, the 
bulk of which involve nonviolent offenders, lose the opportunity to pursue 
other forms of illegal conduct, including organized crime, drug trafficking, 
and fraud.104 That might be a sensible strategy, or a bad bargain. Students can 
make a judgment only if teachers and scholars flag the issue.
Structural factors also help explain the spike in criminal cases involving 
terrorism. Prosecutors have had to compete for resources and bureaucratic 
standing with agencies such as the Pentagon and the CIA that use different 
measures to counter terror. Material support prosecutions help prosecutors 
demonstrate their continued relevance.105 However, prosecutors’ focus on 
informant-driven prosecutions may have opportunity costs. While informants 
are good at enticing big talkers into incriminating statements, they may be 
ineffective at targeting more disciplined types who can do more damage. 
Indeed, some of these more dangerous individuals may use informant status 
to cloak their own activities.106 Who informs on the informants is a worthy 
100. See Julia Preston, Immigration Agency Ends Some Deportations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2010, 
at A14 (citing study indicating record backlog of 247,922 cases, with an average waiting time 
for a hearing of 459 days).
101. On the effects of backlogs in asylum cases, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz 
& Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
295 (2007).
102. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 88–89.
103. See TRAC Immigration, Immigration Enforcement Under Obama Returns to Highs of Bush 
Era, available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/233/ (noting that in April 2010, the 
Border Patrol referred 7,822 new cases to federal prosecutors, most involving charges that 
noncitizens had illegally attempted to reenter the United States after their removal).
104. See Margulies, Law’s Detour, supra note 2, at 89.
105. Cf. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy, supra note 39, at 430–33 (discussing bureaucratic 
crosscurrents within counterterrorism agencies).
106. See Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt & Ginger Thompson, U.S. Had Warnings on Plotter of Mumbai 
Attack, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2010, at A1 (reporting that David Headley, who has pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy regarding the deadly 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, had developed 
contacts with militants in 2002, possibly while he was still working as an informant for the 
Drug Enforcement Agency, and that U.S. officials had failed to act on warnings of Headley’s 
terrorist ties).
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question, but structural competition gives prosecutors little incentive to answer 
it. Here, too, students can better gauge whether incentives are adequate once 
teachers highlight the issue.107
Conclusion
The legal academy’s response to September 11 has been far more robust 
than its responses to most earlier occasions for government overreaching. 
On some fronts such as detention with judicial review, Guantánamo’s second 
generation has seen a welcome substantive convergence favoring measures 
that balance security with the rule of law. Other areas have seen a less salutary 
methodological convergence on the familiar confines of doctrinalism. Teaching 
and scholarship on doctrinally salient matters like detention of suspected 
terrorists apprehended within the United States has overwhelmed teaching 
and analysis of issues that affect more people, such as criminal prosecutions 
under the federal material support statutes. Doctrinalism’s influence has given 
both scholars and law students a skewed vision of counterterrorism measures. 
To correct this distorted lens, law schools should curb doctrinalism’s reach. 
They can do so with three measures. First, they can stress clinics as resources 
teaching advocacy for the unpopular. Second, they can pay greater attention 
to social phenomena like path-dependence. Third, they can study and teach 
about the links between governmental structure and legal policy. Taking these 
steps will help lawyers of the future deal more effectively with terrorism and its 
legal consequences.
107. Scholars who discuss the political economy of legislation and law enforcement have made 
vital contributions to this understanding. See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: 
How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of 
Fear (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (noting influence of both official rhetoric and patronage 
concerns); cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 505 (2001) (describing dynamics of enacting federal criminal statutes); Daniel 
Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver 
Problem, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 295, 317 (2008) (arguing that legislature can counter court-
ordered procedural protections for defendants with more sweeping criminal prohibitions 
that facilitate convictions).
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